Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci in Mali and Burkina Faso: What Combat Use Has Shown

Four years after the first Bayraktar TB2 appeared at Mopti air base, Turkish drones have become a central strike tool for the Sahel juntas. The record of the Bayraktar TB2 Mali and Burkina Faso bought in 2022, and of the heavier Akinci that followed, is mixed: the drones helped Mali retake Kidal in 2023 and let small air forces watch and hit large areas, but they did not stop major ground defeats, and rights groups have documented repeated civilian deaths in strikes by both armies.

Series: Battlefield Proven — Tested in Combat · Conflict / operation period: 2022–2026, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger (Central Sahel insurgencies) · Evidence cut-off: 30 September 2026 · Last updated: 30 September 2026

Photo: A Bayraktar Akinci at Teknofest 2021, Istanbul. File photo, not a Malian aircraft. Credit: CeeGee, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Credit: CeeGee, CC BY-SA 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons.

Direct answer

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger all bought the Bayraktar TB2 in 2022, and Burkina Faso (April 2024) and Mali (December 2024, with more airframes in 2026) added the larger Akinci. Public evidence shows the drones gave these armies persistent surveillance and a precision strike capability they did not have before, and Malian officials credit them with the November 2023 recapture of Kidal and the killing of senior rebel commanders in 2024. The same evidence shows clear limits: drones did not prevent the July 2024 defeat at Tinzaouaten or the loss of Kidal in April 2026, and Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented strikes that killed dozens of civilians.

Where was it used?

The TB2 arrived in the Central Sahel in three near-parallel purchases. Niger took six aircraft by June 2022 under a deal signed in November 2021, according to The Defense Post. Burkina Faso received five from April 2022, defenceWeb reported. In Mali, TB2s were shown to then defence minister Colonel Sadio Camara at Mopti air base on 21 December 2022; the number was not disclosed, and French defence outlet Opex360 cited estimates of four to six. For the wider operator picture, see our list of African Bayraktar TB2 operators.

Operations have concentrated on central Mali and the Liptako-Gourma tri-border zone, northern and eastern Burkina Faso, and Mali’s far north around Kidal, Tessalit and Tinzaouaten on the Algerian border. Sévaré, next to Mopti, has become the hub of Malian drone operations.

All three juntas later formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and bought Turkish drones while replacing French forces and the UN mission in Mali with Russian support.

What was the mission?

The mission is counter-insurgency against jihadist groups (al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and Islamic State Sahel Province) and, in Mali, the Tuareg-led separatists who became the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) in late 2024. In practice the drones do four jobs: wide-area surveillance for armies with few crewed aircraft, strikes on vehicles and gatherings, support to ground offensives, and leadership targeting.

Endurance explains the choice: a TB2 can stay up for about a day with light guided munitions such as the MAM-L, while the Akinci carries heavier weapons over longer distances. Mali’s defence minister said in December 2024 the Akinci would help “neutralise threats wherever they are”, The Defense Post reported.

What does the public evidence show?

Most strike results come from the operators themselves. Independent verification is limited to events that rights groups or wire services investigated, usually because civilians were killed. ACLED data cited by HRW counted 129 air and drone strikes in Mali between January and October 2024, up from 84 in the same period of 2023, and AFP, citing ACLED, reported 62 drone attacks in Mali and 82 in Burkina Faso over 2024.

What worked?

Reach and persistence. Before 2022 the Malian and Burkinabè air arms had a handful of helicopters and light aircraft for vast territories. The TB2 gave them day-and-night observation and strike without risking aircrew. AFP quoted a senior Malian officer praising the speed and “discretion” of Turkish cooperation.

Support to a ground offensive. The clearest operational result is Kidal. Drone strikes hit rebel positions in and around the town in the weeks before FAMa and Wagner entered it on 14 November 2023, ending nearly a decade of separatist control. AFP described the drones’ role as decisive; the rebels withdrew north rather than defend the town street by street.

Leadership targeting. On 1 December 2024 the Malian general staff announced on state television that a “special operation” at Tinzaouaten had killed rebel leaders; the separatists confirmed eight deaths, including Fahad Ag Almahmoud. It was one of the most significant blows to the Tuareg leadership since the 2012 rebellion began.

More range. The Akinci purchases show both governments wanted heavier weapons and longer reach than the TB2 offers, especially for Mali’s far north. Operator strike videos exist, but they are selected by the armies and are not an independent measure of results.

What problems appeared?

Civilian harm. HRW found that three Burkinabè TB2 strikes between August and November 2023, on markets in Bouro and Boulkessi and a funeral near Bidi, killed at least 60 civilians and called them apparent war crimes. Amnesty documented 13 civilians killed at Amasrakad in March 2024 and at least eight, six of them children, at Inadiatafane in October 2024. HRW documented seven civilians, five of them children, killed in the Malian strike on Tinzaouaten in August 2024. Neither government has published an investigation. Where rights groups did not name the drone type, strikes are attributed here to the Malian armed forces, not to a model.

Drones did not change the ground balance on their own. In late July 2024 a FAMa and Wagner column was defeated near Tinzaouaten, widely reported as Wagner’s heaviest defeat in Africa; the drone strikes on the town came afterwards. In April 2026 a coordinated FLA and JNIM offensive took Kidal within about 48 hours and killed defence minister General Sadio Camara in Kati, Al Jazeera reported. Drone strikes on Kidal resumed in May 2026, but the town stayed out of government hands at the evidence cut-off.

The threat changed. Armed groups now fly drones too. Military Africa reported in June 2026 that the FLA claimed repeated FPV attacks on FAMa and Africa Corps positions, and that Africa Corps had begun fielding its own FPV drones. Airfields and control stations are now targets; see our overview of counter-drone systems in African service.

Confirmed losses and limitations

There is no reliable public figure for TB2 or Akinci losses in Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger, and no sortie data, so no attrition rate can be calculated. The public record is limited:

• One Malian Akinci, 31 March–1 April 2025, near Tinzaouaten. Algeria’s Ministry of National Defence said its air defences engaged an armed drone that had entered Algerian airspace. Mali’s government said a FAMa drone on a routine mission had crashed on Malian territory. France 24’s Observers team linked photographed wreckage to Baykar and the Akinci type. The cause remains disputed.
• Ground infrastructure, claimed only. A reported FPV attack on a TB2 control site near Tessalit (September 2025, single OSINT source) and a reported rebel capture of a TB2 control station at Kidal (April 2026, Military Africa) are both unverified.

After the 2025 incident Mali kept buying: further Akinci arrived at Sévaré in January and July 2026. The wider limitation is not the airframe but the system around it: a few bases, vulnerable links and control sites, and intelligence that must tell fighters from civilians in crowded markets and weddings. The last factor has done most damage to the operators’ reputation.

What is still disputed?

• The 2025 border incident. Algeria says it intercepted the drone 2 km inside its airspace; Mali says it never left Malian territory and crashed. On 6 April 2025 Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger recalled their ambassadors from Algiers, and the two countries closed their airspace to each other, defenceWeb reported.
• Casualty figures at Tinzaouaten (August 2024). HRW documented seven civilian deaths; the FLA, a Malian civil-society group and international media reported at least 21. The army said it targeted fighters and equipment.
• Who flies the drones. Some reports say Russian-backed forces use the Turkish drones. AFP interviewed Malian pilots, and no public evidence shows Russian crews flying them; command arrangements with Africa Corps are not public.
• Fleet size. No operator or Baykar has published totals; all figures are estimates.

Did the manufacturer or operator change anything?

The visible change is scale and type, not published doctrine. Burkina Faso added Akinci and more TB2s in April 2024; Mali added Akinci in December 2024, January 2026 and July 2026. Military Africa linked the July batch to a Turkish A400M flight to Sévaré using flight-tracking data, an inference rather than an official statement. Our report on Mali’s latest Akinci batch covers the handover.

Wagner formally left Mali in June 2025 and the state-run Africa Corps took over, Al Jazeera reported; it has since fielded its own FPV drones. See our analysis of Russia’s air link to the Sahel and Africa Corps priorities. No training, maintenance or spares terms between Baykar and the AES states have been published.

Did other countries buy it afterwards?

Within the AES, combat use led to more Turkish purchases, not fewer, and to diversification across Turkish suppliers. For how the Akinci has spread across the continent, see which African countries operate the Akinci.

Burkina Faso has also bought Chinese air defence, as our report on its Sky Dragon 30 test shows, a sign that the AES states now think about protecting their own bases as well as striking from the air.

What does this mean for African procurement?

• Buy the targeting system, not only the aircraft. A strike is only as good as the intelligence behind it. Ground intelligence, target verification and legal review decide whether a strike helps or hands insurgents a recruiting tool.
• Protect the bases. Armed groups are adopting FPV drones, so airfields, hangars and ground stations need counter-drone cover and dispersal. Our TB2 vs Wing Loong II vs CH-4 comparison sets out basing needs by type.
• Drones support ground forces; they do not replace them. Kidal was taken in 2023 with drones plus troops, and lost in 2026 when the troops could not hold it.
• Border rules. Long-range drones near borders can trigger diplomatic crises, as the 2025 dispute with Algeria showed.
• Support and munitions. Fast Turkish delivery is a selling point; buyers should still secure training depth, spares and local maintenance in writing. See Turkish systems in African service and the military equipment database.

Battlefield file: 7 cards

FAQ

Since when has Mali had the Bayraktar TB2?

TB2s were presented to Mali’s defence minister at Mopti air base on 21 December 2022. The number has not been disclosed; French and regional outlets estimated four to six initially.

When did Mali get the Akinci drone?

Mali presented its first Akinci in Bamako on 5 December 2024. Further airframes were handed over at Sévaré on 30 January 2026 and 30 July 2026, according to official ceremonies reported by Military Africa.

Does Burkina Faso use Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci drones?

Yes. Burkina Faso received five TB2s from April 2022 and displayed at least two Akinci and three more TB2s on 8 April 2024. HRW identified TB2s in three 2023 strikes that killed civilians.

What role did drones play in the Kidal operation?

Drone strikes hit rebel positions around Kidal before Malian troops and Wagner entered the town on 14 November 2023. AFP described their role as decisive. Kidal was retaken by the FLA and JNIM in April 2026.

Does Niger have Turkish drones?

Yes. Niger received six TB2s in 2022 and unveiled a TUSAŞ Aksungur, a larger Turkish drone from a different manufacturer, in September 2025.

Are Russian forces flying Mali’s Turkish drones?

There is no documented public evidence of that. AFP has interviewed Malian drone pilots. Malian drones and Wagner, now Africa Corps, have operated in the same campaigns, but the command arrangements are not public.

Sources

• Opex360: Le Mali a reçu des drones tactiques turcs Bayraktar TB-2 (Dec 2022)
• The Defense Post: Turkey delivers six Bayraktar drones to Niger (Jun 2022)
• defenceWeb: Burkina Faso acquires more military vehicles and UAVs (May 2024)
• Janes: Burkina Faso receives Akinci UAVs
• The Defense Post: Mali receives Turkish Akinci drones (Dec 2024)
• Military Africa: Mali acquires additional Akinci drones (Aug 2026)
• AFP via France 24: African armies turn to drones with devastating civilian impact (Jul 2025)
• Human Rights Watch: Burkina Faso drone strikes on civilians apparent war crimes (Jan 2024)
• Human Rights Watch: Mali, atrocities by the army and Wagner Group (Dec 2024)
• Amnesty International: Amasrakad drone strikes (Mar 2024)
• Amnesty International: Inadiatafane drone strikes (Nov 2024)
• Reuters via TimesLIVE: Mali says it killed rebel commander in drone strike (Dec 2024)
• France 24 Observers: wreckage analysis near Tinzaouaten (Apr 2025)
• defenceWeb: Algeria-Mali drone incident (Apr 2025)
• Al Jazeera: Wagner leaving Mali, Africa Corps to remain (Jun 2025)
• Al Jazeera: Mali’s defence minister killed amid coordinated attacks (Apr 2026)
• The Defense Post: Mali army drone strikes on rebel-held Kidal (May 2026)
• Military Africa: Africa Corps deploys FPV drones in Mali (Jun 2026)
• Al Jazeera (AFP): Mali drone strikes kill at least 10 civilians at wedding (May 2026)
• Army Recognition: Niger rolls out Turkish Aksungur drone (Sep 2025)

Evidence note: strike results in this article are mostly claims by the Malian and Burkinabè armed forces, which rarely publish details and do not allow independent access to strike sites. Civilian casualty figures come from HRW, Amnesty International and wire services and may differ from government statements. Fleet sizes and loss totals have not been published by any operator. This article will be updated at the same URL if significant new evidence appears.

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• Pantsir-S1 in Libya: What the Battlefield Record Revealed
• Drones in the Ethiopia War: What Is Confirmed and What Remains Unverified
• Wing Loong II in Libya: How Did China's Armed Drone Perform in Combat?

See also the flagship database: Which African Countries Have Military Drones?