Sudan Defence Budget: What SIPRI, the Finance Ministry and the Collapsing Pound Actually Show

The Sudan defence budget is one of the hardest numbers in Africa to pin down: the last year in which SIPRI published a Sudanese military spending figure is 2021, the 2026 emergency budget has been approved but not published, and the pound has lost most of its value against the dollar since the war began. This page shows what actually exists, year by year, who published it, and why a single dollar figure for 2022–2026 would be misleading.

Data as of 27 October 2026. Figures are open-source estimates; see “A note on the numbers”.

How much does Sudan spend on its military?

Nobody can say precisely, and the honest answer has three layers. First, there is the last internationally compiled figure: SIPRI’s Military Expenditure Database holds a Sudanese series for 2005–2009 and 2015–2021 and marks every other year, including 2022 to 2025, as unavailable. Its footnote says the Sudan figures cover “military, policy [sic] and security” spending, are adopted budgets rather than actual expenditure, and exclude possible off-budget financing from oil revenues. Second, there are statements by officials about shares of the budget rather than amounts. Third, there are unofficial estimates, from leaked documents or index compilers, which cannot be checked. This page keeps those three layers apart.

Sudan defence spending year by year, 2015–2026

All dollar figures in the SIPRI rows are SIPRI’s own conversion at that year’s exchange rate, which is why the dollar total falls from US$4.36 billion in 2017 to US$369 million in 2021 even though the pound figure rose almost fivefold. The drop reflects the devaluation of the pound, not a fall in what the state intended to spend in local currency. The implied rate column is simply the pound figure divided by the dollar figure, and shows the scale of the slide before the war. The percentage-of-GDP figures also fall for the same reason. As with all adopted-budget series, the table is what the state planned to spend, not what it paid.

SIPRI has no figures for 2010–2014. Sudan’s currency was redenominated during the period covered, and SIPRI converts every earlier figure into the current pound, so the early rows are comparable with the later ones only in proportion, not in absolute pounds.

Who publishes the number, and what each source covers

SIPRI. The Stockholm institute’s database is the only internationally compiled series, and it stops at 2021. SIPRI’s regional tables for Africa carry an explicit list of countries omitted because data is missing for too many years or cannot be converted: Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan. That means Sudan is not folded into the African totals SIPRI publishes, so those totals cannot be used to infer a Sudanese figure. The SIPRI database footnote dates the loss of data to the “civil war” in 2022, a year before fighting began in April 2023; we quote it as written.

The Sudanese state. Budget laws and ministry statements are the primary source, but they are not published in usable form. The Council of Ministers approved the 2026 emergency budget on 30 December 2025 and the joint Sovereignty Council and cabinet session approved it again in Khartoum on 21 January 2026. The communiqués give growth and inflation targets (about 9% GDP growth and average inflation of 65%, compared with 101.9% in 2025) and say the budget provides for “the needs of armed forces and security agencies”. They give no totals and no defence line.

The finance minister. Gibril Ibrahim told AFP in January 2026 that authorities allocated 40% of the 2025 budget to the war effort, up from 36% in 2024, and did not specify amounts. “War effort” is not the same category as SIPRI’s military, police and security line, and the share is of the whole budget, so it cannot be converted into a defence figure without an unpublished total.

The World Bank. Its October 2026 Macro Poverty Outlook estimates Sudan’s 2025 GDP at US$60.2 billion, revenues at 4.7% of GDP and the fiscal deficit at 5.0% of GDP. It has no defence line. The Ayin Network reported that economists put military spending at US$6.3 billion in a leaked 2025 budget; the wording is ambiguous (it may describe total spending) and the leaked document cannot be tested, so we rely on neither that figure nor any dollar conversion of it.

Index compilers. Global Firepower lists a 2026 defence budget of US$394.7 million with no source or method. It is close to SIPRI’s 2021 dollar figure of US$369 million but, like it, pre-dates the collapse of the pound. We show it only to reject it as a current figure.

IISS. The Military Balance carries a Sudan entry with a defence-spending line but is paywalled; we could not verify what it shows for any year.

Why dollar conversions mislead

The Sudanese pound has two prices: a bank rate and a much weaker street rate, and both have moved a long way since the war. The parallel rate was about SDG 565 to the dollar in April 2023, according to Dabanga; the same report put it at SDG 8,400 in mid-September 2026, up from SDG 6,000 three weeks earlier, a roughly 14-fold fall. By 21 October 2026, dealers in Khartoum quoted SDG 10,105 to the dollar on the street while bank quotes were about SDG 4,200, according to Sudan Tribune as reported by the Rio Times, so the two rates were about 2.4 times apart. In February 2025 the Ayin Network’s own pound-to-dollar conversions imply a rate near SDG 2,600. Any dollar value we put on a pound figure from 2022 onwards therefore depends entirely on which rate and which date is chosen. We have not computed one. Sudanese economists quoted by Dabanga also argue that government purchases of dollars on the parallel market, to finance weapons and fuel, are contributing to the slide; that is an attributed view.

What the headline figure leaves out

• Off-budget oil financing. SIPRI’s footnote says its Sudan figures do not include possible off-budget funding from oil revenues. Oil revenue has fallen by more than half, according to the finance minister, but gold has become a larger source: he said 70 tonnes were produced in 2025 with only 20 tonnes exported through official channels. How much of either funds the military is not published.
• Money creation. The World Bank says the broad money supply expanded 46% between December 2025 and June 2026 and that weak revenue has increased reliance on central-bank monetisation of the budget deficit. Spending financed by printing pounds does not show up as a rise in revenue.
• The wider security sector. Nuba Reports, citing a copy of the 2016 budget, found “defence and security” at about SDG 17 billion, or 25% of the SDG 67.5 billion total, which matches SIPRI’s 2016 figure of SDG 16.95 billion; the same article quoted economists and a monitoring group who put the true security share far higher. Those larger shares are estimates of the security sector, not of the defence line.
• Foreign supply and credit. Reported arms packages, such as the roughly US$1.5 billion Pakistani package reported by Reuters in January 2026, have no published financing terms; reports have named Saudi Arabia as a possible broker or backer, which is unconfirmed.
• The RSF and its allies. The Rapid Support Forces are not in the state budget. Their funding is not published by anyone, and claims about it are disputed (see Sudan military strength for what is alleged and denied). The RSF-aligned Tasis alliance has reportedly approved a 2026 programme and budget for its parallel government; we found no figures.

How Sudan compares with neighbours

On SIPRI’s own figures, Sudan’s last recorded military spending of US$369 million in 2021 was below Egypt’s, Kenya’s and Uganda’s that year and in the range of Chad’s and Ethiopia’s, though the comparison is distorted by the pound’s collapse and by Sudan’s adopted-budget basis. For Kenya’s own budget estimates see Kenya military strength; for Africa-wide rankings see African defence budgets ranked, which does not include a Sudan figure for the reasons above.

Short answers

What is Sudan’s defence budget in 2026?

No verified public figure. The emergency budget for 2026 was approved on 30 December 2025 and 21 January 2026 but its totals and defence allocation have not been published.

How much of Sudan’s budget goes to the army?

The finance minister said 40% of the 2025 budget went to the war effort (36% in 2024). That share is the only official figure and has no published amounts behind it. Estimates of 70% or 90% in other reporting come from economists or leaked documents and are not official.

Why does SIPRI not show Sudan after 2021?

Because no military expenditure data has been available to it, according to a footnote in its database, and because no reliable conversion of pounds into dollars exists at the current exchange rate. SIPRI also leaves Sudan out of its African regional totals.

Related pages

Context on the forces this money pays for is in Sudan military strength, the aircraft in Sudan Air Force aircraft and the ranks in Sudan army ranks. Arms transfers and the embargo are covered in the UN Darfur embargo renewal and the Mohafiz-V report; the continental picture is in Africa’s strongest militaries. The East Africa desk carries the running news.

A note on the numbers

Official: SIPRI’s series (a compilation of Sudanese budget documents, and adopted budgets rather than outturns), the cabinet and Sovereignty Council approvals of the 2026 emergency budget, and the finance minister’s 36% and 40% shares. Estimated: all dollar conversions, which use SIPRI’s year-average rates up to 2021; the World Bank’s GDP, revenue and deficit figures, which are its own estimates. Contradicted or unclear: the Ayin Network’s US$6.3 billion (ambiguous scope, leaked draft) and the footnote’s 2022 date against the April 2023 start of the war. Not verified: any 2022–2026 pound or dollar defence figure, the IISS entry, the US State Department’s fiscal-transparency finding that no enacted budget has been published (not read in full), and street-rate quotes from Sudan Tribune, which we saw only through the Rio Times. We have not converted any post-2021 figure to dollars.

Sources

• SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 1949–2025 (Sudan series, Africa regional totals, footnotes 33–34), accessed 27 October 2026
• AFP via Arab News, Sudan ‘lost all sources of revenue’ in the war: finance minister to AFP (13 January 2026), accessed 27 October 2026
• SUNA via allAfrica, Cabinet approves State’s emergency budget for fiscal year 2026 (30 December 2025), accessed 27 October 2026
• Sudan Ministry of Culture, Information and Tourism, joint meeting approves the 2026 emergency budget (22 January 2026), accessed 27 October 2026
• World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook: Sudan (October 2026), accessed 27 October 2026
• Ayin Network, Leaked budget boosts military spending, cuts critical services further (17 February 2025), accessed 27 October 2026
• Dabanga via allAfrica, Sudanese pound plunges despite government measures (18 September 2026), accessed 27 October 2026
• Rio Times, Sudan pound falls past 10,000 to the dollar on street, citing Sudan Tribune (October 2026), accessed 27 October 2026
• Nuba Reports, Sudan’s economy: annual budget designed for war (2016 budget), accessed 27 October 2026
• Global Firepower (unofficial index), 2026 Sudan Military Strength, accessed 27 October 2026
• The Defense Post, Pakistan to Sign $1.5B Arms Sale With Sudan (12 January 2026), accessed 27 October 2026