Sudan drone suppliers have become one of the most contested questions of the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), because both sides now fly armed drones whose origins are traced through wreckage, shipment records and satellite imagery rather than official contracts. Turkish, Iranian and Chinese designs appear on the army side, while Chinese long-endurance drones are linked to the RSF through allegations that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) rejects. This guide separates what has been documented from what remains a claim. Each item is labelled as reported, alleged or confirmed, and the guide explains why the supply chain matters for buyers and exporters across Africa and the Middle East.
Sudan Drone Suppliers: Key Facts at a Glance
No government has published a full account of the drones used in this war, so the public record rests on a handful of evidence types. Amnesty International documented Chinese-made drone jammers in use by both sides in its 2024 investigation of arms flows. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) reported a Turkish contract for six Bayraktar TB2 drones, and Western officials told Bloomberg that Iran had supplied Mohajer-6 drones to the army. Wreckage images published by open-source researchers support claims about the Akıncı and the Chinese CH-95.
Three points hold across most reporting. The army relies mainly on Türkiye and Iran, with a reported Pakistani package whose status is unclear. The RSF is linked to Chinese long-endurance drones and to supply routes through Chad, both of which the UAE and Chad reject. The United Nations arms embargo covers only Darfur, which leaves most of the country outside its scope.
Why the Sudan Drone War Matters for African and Middle Eastern Defence Markets
The airframes that appear in Sudan are on sale across the region, so battlefield evidence now shapes export debates. Baykar’s TB2 and Akıncı are covered in our guides to TB2 operators in Africa and Akıncı customers in Africa, and both types now feature in reports from Sudan. FDD noted that the TB2 sale took place about five months after the US Treasury sanctioned Sudan’s Defense Industries System, the army’s procurement agency, and said the shipments appear to violate US and EU sanctions. That is FDD’s reading, and Baykar has not commented on the sales claims, according to Military Africa.
Geography adds weight. Bloomberg noted that Sudan’s roughly 400-mile Red Sea coastline is strategically important, with China, Russia and Türkiye competing for access.
The Army’s Drone Suppliers: Türkiye, Iran and Reported Newcomers
On Türkiye, FDD reported that Baykar sold drones to the army’s Defense Industries System under a $120 million deal covering six TB2 drones, three ground control stations and 600 warheads, with the sale dated 16 November 2023. Military Africa gives a figure of €110.7 million and notes that some accounts speak of eight TB2 drones in total. These remain press reports, not official statements.
The larger Akıncı is also in army service, according to Military Africa. The RSF claimed three shoot-downs in 2025: over El Fasher on 10 July, in early September after a strike on a market in South Darfur, and over Al Khoei in West Kordofan on 13 September. Only the third was described as verified through wreckage images, and no delivery date or contract for the type appears in the sources reviewed.
On Iran, Bloomberg reported on 24 January 2024 that senior Western officials said Tehran had supplied the army with Mohajer-6 combat drones. The National reported that analysts who reviewed satellite imagery confirmed the drone’s presence in Sudan but could not establish how many had arrived, and that the military spokesman’s office did not answer calls. Military Africa reported earlier that month that RSF fighters had reportedly shot down an army Mohajer-6 over Khartoum with a man-portable missile.
A Pakistani route has also been reported. Reuters reported in January 2026 that Pakistan and Sudan were close to a $1.5 billion arms package including more than 200 unmanned aircraft, and later reported that the deal was on hold after Saudi objections. Sudan Tribune then reported deliveries of Pakistani armoured vehicles and drones without quantities, which our report on the Mohafiz-V vehicles covers. At the time of writing, the status of the package was unclear.
RSF Drone Suppliers: The CH-95 Case and the UAE Allegations
In December 2024 the army said it had captured three Chinese-made CH-95 drones and six smaller armed drones in RSF-held territory near Nyala, which it described as a transfer from the UAE through Chad. Sudan’s foreign minister said the drones were assembled in the UAE and launched from Chad, and Chad denied the accusation. Military Africa noted that the smaller drones’ UAE link was not confirmed independently, and that a source said one CH-95 belonged to the Sudanese Air Force and had crashed.
The CH-95 is made by Aerospace Times Feihong Technology, a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, according to Military Africa. On 7 July 2026 the army said ground-based air defences shot one down on the Export Road between Bara and Omdurman. The army statement is the only source for that kill (see our report on the Wad Banda claim), and attribution to the RSF rests on the RSF being the only known operator of the type in Sudan.
FDD cites a Sudan Conflict Observatory report that concluded, with near certainty, that 32 flights carried weapons from the UAE to the RSF between June 2023 and May 2024. The flights are not itemised as drones. The UAE has denied arming either side. Amnesty identified recently made UAE armoured personnel carriers and Serbian rifles with RSF units but named no drone supplier in that release.
Drone Types and Origins: What Is Documented
The table below lists the main types linked to Sudan drone suppliers in the reporting reviewed for this guide, with a status label for each. Reported means a credible outlet or official source said so without independent verification. Documented means images or wreckage support the claim.
| Type | Reported user | Origin | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bayraktar TB2 | SAF | Türkiye (Baykar) | Contract reported by FDD; not officially confirmed |
| Bayraktar Akıncı | SAF | Türkiye (Baykar) | In army use; three losses claimed by the RSF, one verified by wreckage |
| Mohajer-6 | SAF | Iran | Reported by Western officials; presence confirmed by analysts, numbers unknown |
| CH-95 (FH-95) | RSF (reported) | China (CASC subsidiary) | Army claims of capture and shoot-down; UAE route alleged and denied |
| Drone jammers | SAF and RSF | China | Documented by Amnesty |
| Pakistani UAVs | SAF | Pakistan | Reported; package status unclear |
Denials, Embargo Gaps and Regional Reactions
Every Sudan drone suppliers claim named so far has been denied or left without comment. The UAE denies arming either side, Chad rejected the Nyala transfer story, and Baykar has not commented on the sales claims. Ethiopia has called Sudan’s accusation that drones launch from its territory baseless, while Sudan’s government presented a tally of alleged attacks on 28 October that has not been independently verified, as set out in our report on the Asosa and Bahir Dar accusations.
The legal frame is narrow. Amnesty says the UN arms embargo applies only to Darfur and called it completely inadequate, urging the Security Council to extend it to all of Sudan and to strengthen monitoring. A transfer to the army outside Darfur therefore falls outside the UN measure itself, although national sanctions and export controls still apply.
Counter-Drone Systems Add a Second Supply Chain
Amnesty found Chinese drone jammers in use on both sides, and Military Africa reported that debris of a Turkish HİSAR-A air-defence missile was identified in Khartoum in June. The outlet called it the first documented evidence of the system in army use against drone attacks, although the firing itself is described as reported. RSF footage dated 21 May, which appeared to show a Chinese-built drone destroying a HİSAR-A launcher in North Kordofan, was disputed by army-aligned accounts.
On the RSF side, Military Africa says the Wagner Group supplied surface-to-air missiles in 2023, citing US Treasury sanctions, and that Chinese FK-2000 systems came from the UAE, which it presents as an allegation.
What to Watch Next
- New wreckage and serial-number evidence, which is the main route by which supplier claims become verifiable.
- Whether any contract or delivery of the reported Pakistani package is confirmed.
- Whether the Security Council acts on calls to extend the arms embargo beyond Darfur.
- Independent verification of the accusations about drones launched from Ethiopia.
- Responses from Turkish, Chinese and Emirati authorities and manufacturers to the Sudan drone suppliers allegations.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who supplies drones to the Sudanese army?
Reporting points to Türkiye, linked to a TB2 contract reported at $120 million, and to Iran, whose Mohajer-6 was reported by Western officials in early 2024. A Pakistani package has also been reported, but its status is unclear. None of these governments or companies has confirmed the sales in the sources reviewed.
Who supplies drones to the RSF?
No supplier has been confirmed. The army alleges that Chinese-made CH-95 drones reach the RSF from the UAE through Chad, and both countries deny it. The Sudan Conflict Observatory documented flights from the UAE to the RSF, but they are not itemised as drones. Amnesty found Chinese jammers on both sides.
Does a UN arms embargo cover Sudan?
Only partly. Amnesty says the existing UN arms embargo applies only to Darfur, and in July 2024 it urged the Security Council to extend it to the whole country and to strengthen monitoring and verification. Transfers elsewhere in Sudan fall under national sanctions and export controls rather than a country-wide UN embargo.
Which drones are used in the Sudan war?
Reported army types include the Bayraktar TB2, Bayraktar Akıncı and Mohajer-6. The RSF is linked to the Chinese CH-95 and to shorter-range drones used for scouting and dropping munitions. Both sides use Chinese-made jammers. Most attributions rest on wreckage, imagery and press reports, not on official procurement records.
Sources
- Amnesty International, Sudan: constant flow of arms fuelling relentless civilian suffering (July 2024)
- FDD, Is Turkey playing both sides of Sudan’s civil war?
- The National, Reports on drones used by Sudan’s army
- Bloomberg, Iranian drones become latest proxy tool in Sudan’s civil war
- Military Africa, RSF shoot down Sudan’s Army Mohajer drone
- Military Africa, Controversy surrounding the CH-95 drones in Sudan
- Military Africa, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone instrumental in Sudan Army’s advances
- Military Africa, RSF shoots down Sudan’s third Akinci drone
- Military Africa, Akinci drones clash over Sudan
- Military Africa, Sudanese Armed Forces downed a rebel Chinese CH-95 drone
- Military Africa, Turkish air defense missile wreckage surfaces in Sudan’s drone war